Do Companies View Bribes as a Tax? Evidence on the Tradeoff between Corporate Taxes and Corruption in the Location of FDI by Goodspeed, Timothy et al.
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Economics Faculty Publications Department of Economics
2013
Do Companies View Bribes as a Tax? Evidence on
the Tradeoff between Corporate Taxes and
Corruption in the Location of FDI
Timothy Goodspeed
Hunter College, timothy.goodspeed@hunter.cuny.edu
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez
Georgia State University, jorgemartinez@gsu.edu
Li Zhang
Central University of Finance and Economics
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_facpub
Part of the Economics Commons
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Economics at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Economics Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more
information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Timothy Goodspeed, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, and Li Zhang. Do Companies View Bribes as a Tax? Evidence on the Tradeoff between
Corporate Taxes and Corruption in the Location of FDI in Clemens Fuest, George Zodrow, eds. Critical Issues in Taxation and
Development, pp. 45-64, published by The MIT Press, 2013.
Critical Issues in Taxation and D evelopm ent
edited by Clemens Fuest and George R. Zodrow
CESHo
The M IT Press 
Cam bridge, M assachusetts 
London, England
H-5
HS\°i 
,C15 
a o  13
© 2013 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic 
or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and 
retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher.
MIT Press books may be purchased at special quantity discounts for business or sales 
promotional use. For information, please email special_sales@mitpress.mit.edu or write 
to Special Sales Department, The MIT Press, 55 Hayward Street, Cambridge, MA 02142.
Set in Palatino by Toppan Best-set Premedia Limited. Printed and bound in the United 
States of America.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Critical issues in taxation and development / edited by Clemens Fuest and George R. 
Zodrow.
p. cm — (CESifo seminar series)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-262-01897-5 (hbk. : alk. paper) 1. Taxation— Developing countries. 2. Tax 
evasion—Developing countries. 3. Economic development—Developing countries. I. 
Fuest, Clemens, 1968- II. Zodrow, George R.
HJ2319.C75 2013 
336.200912'4— dc23
2012036427
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Do Com panies View Bribes as a Tax? Evidence on 
the Tradeoff betw een Corporate Taxes and 
Corruption in the Location of FDI
T im o th y  G o o d sp e e d , Jo rg e  M artin ez-V azq u ez , and  
Li Z h an g
A large literature has documented the fact that high corporate taxes 
in host countries deter foreign direct investment. In a series of meta­
studies, de Mooij and Ederveen (2003, 2008) find that the average 
estimated tax semi-elasticity of FDI is -3 .3  percent. Altshuler, Grubert, 
and Newlon (2001) find that the elasticity of investment with respect 
to after-tax host-country rates of return for US multinationals increased 
(in absolute value) from -1 .5  in 1984 to -2 .8  in 1992. Altshuler and 
Grubert (2004) find evidence of investment tax elasticities of about 3 
over the years 1992,1998, and 2000. Summarizing much of the research 
on the taxation of multinationals, Gordon and Hines (2002) write that 
the econometric work of the preceding fifteen years “provides ample 
evidence of the sensitivity of the level and location of FDI to its tax 
treatm ent."
Much of the work in this area has concentrated on developed coun­
tries. There are, however, some studies of developing countries, sur­
veyed in Madies and Dethier (2010, p. 20). "M ost empirical studies," 
Madies and Dethier write, "conclude that FDI inflows into developing 
countries are sensitive, to various degrees, to corporate income taxation 
and fiscal incentives." For instance, Hines (2001) finds some evidence 
that Japanese investment is higher when tax-sparing agreements relieve 
the usual tax that would be owed on profits generated in low-tax 
developing countries. Klemm and Van Parys (2009) find that tax incen­
tives help attract FDI in their sample of developing countries but do 
not increase gross private fixed capital formation or growth. Banga 
(2003) examines FDI flows in South, East, and Southeast Asia and finds 
that fiscal incentives attract FDI from developing countries and that the 
presence of a bilateral investment treaty is important for developed 
countries. Cleeve (2008) studies foreign investment going to sub- 
Saharan Africa and finds that tax holidays attract FDI. With respect to
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emerging market economies, Beliak and Leibrecht (2009) find signifi­
cant tax effects for Central and Eastern Europe, with an estimated 
semi-elasticity ranging from -3 .3  to -4 .6 .
Yet recent evidence suggests that there is something different about 
the relationship between corporate taxes and FDI in developing coun­
tries. For instance, Goodspeed, Martinez-Vazquez, and Zhang (2011) 
find that high host-country corporate taxes negatively affect incoming 
FDI in host countries that are developed, but not in host countries that 
are developing. Dharmapala and Hines (2009) find that taxes affect US 
FDI in well-governed tax havens, but not in poorly governed ones. 
Fatica (2009) finds that the sensitivity of foreign investment to the tax 
rate varies with the quality of institutions in the host country. These 
mixed results suggest some natural questions. Is there something dif­
ferent between developing and developed countries that affects the 
estimated tax elasticity? Are the results of previous studies that concen­
trate on developed countries (particularly the United States), or analyze 
samples that mix developing and developed countries, primarily due 
to the sampling of developed countries? If so, what lies behind the lack 
of sensitivity of FDI to corporate tax in some developing countries?
Our starting point is the finding by Goodspeed, Martinez-Vazquez, 
and Zhang (2011) that FDI entering developing countries and FDI 
entering developed countries react differently to corporate taxes. 
Though there are several possible explanations, in this chapter we 
investigate only one: that firms perceive a tradeoff between taxes and 
bribes. Previous papers, most importantly Wei 2000a and Wei 2000b, 
have reported that corruption negatively affects FDI, and we found the 
sam e in our earlier paper (cited above). Corruption effects m ay also 
interact with tax effects, however, so the relationship may not be as 
simple as it first appears. And there have been very few investigations 
of the impact of the interaction of corruption and taxation on FDI, Wei 
2001 being an important exception. Wei finds negative effects of both 
taxes and corruption on FDI but no evidence of an interaction effect. 
Dharmapala and Hines (2009) also find a significant interaction of 
governance and taxes for US multinationals. Because their focus is on 
the determinants of tax havens, their interpretation is that small coun­
tries that are poorly governed m ay recognize that the elasticity of 
foreign investment to taxes is smaller for them, and hence decline to 
lower taxes to attract foreign investment.
One reason that good governance and taxation may interact is that 
corruption may itself be interpreted as a sort of tax on doing business.
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If tax administration in developing countries is weak, the more impor­
tant "tax" in a developing country might be bribery paym ents or a lack 
of the rule of law. Formal tax payments to the government might 
go unpaid without consequence if tax administration is weak, while 
bribery payments m ay be less easily avoided since bribes are usually 
enforced by the bribe-taker at the moment of the transaction. Such 
bribes could go directly to corrupt tax officials in exchange for over­
looking tax evasion. In principle, bribery payments and tax payments 
could be substitutes or complements. If they are complements, bribery 
payments would be paid in addition to full tax payments. It seems 
more likely that they are substitutes (so that firms would have to pay 
less than the full tax on a combination of bribery and tax payments) 
when the bribe paym ents go directly to tax bureaucrats in exchange 
for reduced tax paym ents, since a corporation presumably would not 
agree to pay more than the legal tax liability.
Consider now how this interaction of bribery and taxation affects 
FDI. The relationship between the two will affect how each alone affects 
FDI. If bribes and tax payments are substitutes, the impact of each alone 
on FDI will be lessened when both are present, whereas the impact of 
each alone on FDI will be strengthened if they are complements. Take, 
for instance, the effect of taxes on FDI. Many studies have found that 
taxes negatively affect FDI. But if corruption and taxes are substitutes, 
the presence of corruption should be expected to weaken the impor­
tance of formal taxation in determining FDI location. That is, the elastic­
ity of FDI to taxes would be lower in the presence of corruption; in the 
extreme it should be zero, as any effect of taxation could be offset with 
a sufficiently large bribe. This is a question that has not been closely 
examined in the literature.
By the same token, the impact of corruption on FDI location would 
be affected by the presence of taxation. If taxes and corruption are 
substitutes, the im pact of corruption on FDI location would be most 
acute when taxes are low. Conversely, if taxes are high, the impact of 
corruption on FDI location would not be as important. The reason 
could be that when taxes are excessively high corruption allows mul­
tinationals to avoid excessive taxation. The argument is that when there 
are excessive taxes, regulations, or bureaucratic red tape in setting up 
a business, paying a bribe may "grease the wheels" and allow a busi­
ness to avoid the constraints imposed by excessive government (see, 
e.g., Leff 1964; Liu 1985), including taxes. This does not, however, nec­
essarily mean that such an economy is more efficient. For example,
48 Goodspeed, Martinez-Vazquez, and Zhang
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that bribes are actually much more 
distortionary and costly to an economy than tax payments.
Almost no one has examined this relationship between corporate 
taxes and corruption empirically Wei (2001) again being the exception. 
Wei finds negative effects of both taxes and corruption on FDI but no 
evidence of an interaction effect.
Our findings indicate that there is a tradeoff between taxes and 
bribes. We find that taxes and corruption are substitutes so that the 
impact of taxes on FDI will be lessened when corruption is higher. Since 
corruption tends to be more prevalent and tax administration weaker 
in developing countries, this helps explain why, in general, corporate 
taxes have less of an impact on the level of FDI in developing countries. 
The substitutability result also suggests that the impact of corruption 
on FDI location is lessened when taxes are high. This does not mean 
that an econom y in which taxes and corruption are high is more effi­
cient than an econom y with high taxes and low corruption, however.
1 Data Description
Our main objective in this chapter is to explore empirically a possible 
explanation for our earlier finding that corporate taxes are important 
for FDI going to developed countries but not for FDI going to develop­
ing countries. The explanation that w e explore is that multinationals 
view taxes and corruption as substitutes. We use a panel data set with 
information on 25 developing and 27 developed destination countries 
from 1985 to 2002. The FDI source countries are the OECD countries. 
For our dependent variable we use the OECD bilateral data on the (log 
of) the total stock of FDI in a destination country in each year that 
comes from each OECD source country. There are reasons to view data 
coming developing countries with care, and the O ECD's source-coun­
try data may be the most reliable such data available.
We follow the previous literature and control for factors that consis­
tently have been found to be determinants of FDI: distance, population, 
GDP, the unemployment rate, and exports; the last variable, exports, is 
lagged to try to correct for potential endogeneity. The distance between 
countries is suggested by the gravity equation as a determinant of FDI. 
The unemployment rate controls for business cycle effects. Population 
is a proxy for market size, which, ceteris paribus, should attract more 
FDI. Exports control for the openness of an economy. Holding popula­
tion constant, GDP is a measure of wealth and can be roughly inter­
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preted as controlling for the return on investment or marginal product 
of capital. Generally, poorer countries lack capital and hence should be 
expected to have a higher return on investment than wealthier coun­
tries, ceteris paribus, which implies an inverse relationship between 
GDP and FDI. We also include a source-country dummy to control for 
any observable or unobservable source-country factors that affect FDI 
and that do not vary over time.
O ur corporate tax variable is computed as the minimum of (1) the 
effective tax rate faced by US multinationals calculated using data from 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and (2) the statutory tax rate 
from data from the Office of Tax Policy Research (OTPR). This variable 
takes into account the fact that the statutory tax rate may be too high 
because of accelerated depreciation and other investment allowances, 
tax holidays, and so forth, that may be granted by the host country. The 
effective tax rate in (1) is a simple measure of foreign taxes paid in the 
host country divided by profits; if it is lower than the statutory rate, 
we use this measure as a more accurate reflection of the true tax burden. 
This measure is also used by Hines and Rice (1994) and by Dharmapala 
and Hines (2009). We also lag our tax variable to try to correct for any 
endogeneity.
We use tw o different measures of good governance. The first is 
a measure of corruption, the "Corruption Perception Index" from 
Transparency International. This index is commonly used— e.g., by Wei 
(2000a,b)— and has the most coverage for the countries in our sample. 
This index ranges in value between 0 and 10. It uses a higher number 
for less corruption so in our empirical work we subtract the index from 
10 to facilitate interpretation.
Our second measure of good governance is the somewhat different 
rule-of-law index of Kaufmann et al. (2009, p. 6), which is designed to 
measure "perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in 
and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of con­
tract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well 
as the likelihood of crime and violence." This measure is somewhat 
different from pure corruption, as it deals more with property rights. 
It is available only every two years during our sample period, so our 
sample size is smaller for this measure.
We should note that observations of the tax rate and the good 
governance measures are available for varying numbers of years and 
countries. In all, 52 countries (25 developing and 27 developed) are 
covered for the tax rate for the years 1985-2002. The time span is shorter
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Table 3.1
Sample countries.
1 ’ Argentina 27 Italy
2 Australia 28 •Jamaica
3 Austria 29 Japan
4 ’ Barbados 30 Korea, Republic of
5 Belgium 31 Luxembourg
6 •Brazil 32 •Malaysia
7 Canada 33 •Mexico
8 ’Chile 34 Netherlands
9 ’China 35 New Zealand
10 ’Colombia 36 Norway
11 ’Costa Rica 37 •Panama
12 Denmark 38 •Peru
13 ’Dominican Republic 39 •Philippines
14 ’ Ecuador 40 Portugal
15 •Egypt 41 •Saudi Arabia
16 Finland 42 Singapore
17 France 43 Spain
18 Germany 44 Sweden
19 Greece 45 Switzerland
20 •Guatemala 46 •Thailand
21 •Honduras 47 •Trinidad and Tobago
22 Hong Kong 48 •Turkey
23 ‘ India 49 United Arab Emirates
24 •Indonesia 50 United Kingdom
25 Ireland 51 United States
26 Israel 52 ’ Venezuela
'developing countries
for our other variables. The corruption index covers 47 countries from  
1995 to 2002. The rule-of-law index covers all the 52 countries, but only 
for the years 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002. We limit our regressions to 
include countries and years for which all relevant information is avail­
able. The countries covered, their developm ent statuses, the definition 
and sources of our variables, and sum m ary statistics are presented in 
tables 3.1-3.3.
2 Empirical Analysis and Estim ation Results
O ur primary purpose is to explore w hether taxes and good governance 
are viewed as substitutes by multinationals in their foreign investment
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Table 3.2
Data sources.
Variable Further explanation Source Years
FDI FDI stocks Bilateral OECD data 1985-2002
Population In 10,000s World Development
Indicator (WDI)
2006
1985-2002
GDP In current dollars WDI 2006 1985-2002
Exports Goods and services •. World Bank 1985-2002
Tax Rate The minimum of the BEA 
tax rate and statutory tax 
rate, where BEA tax rate = 
foreign income taxes/ 
(foreign income tax + net 
income) of all affiliates for 
US firms operating abroad 
in each country and year
Calculated with 
data from Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
(BEA) and OTPR 
for statutory rate
1985-2002
Corruption
Perception
Index
Ranges from 0 to 0, with 
10 denoting least corrupt, 
transformed by 
subtracting from 10 for 
ease of interpretation
Transparency
International
1995-2002
Rule of Law One of the six governance 
indicators from the 
Aggregate Governance 
Indicators 1996-2008. 
Ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, 
transformed to 0 to 5, with 
higher values 
corresponding to better 
governance outcomes.
Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Mastruzzi 2009
Biannual 
data for 
1996­
2002, and 
annual 
data for 
2003-2008
Distance Distance between capital 
cities of two countries
CEPII Constant 
over years
Unemployment
Rate
Total unemployment rate, 
percentage of total 
unemployed in total labor 
force
World Development 
Indicator (WDI) 
2006
1985-2002
52 Goodspeed, Martinez-Vazquez, and Zhang
Table 3.3
Summary statistics.
Variable Observations Mean SD
FDI Stock 9,254 4,171 15,060
Tax Rate 26,136 31.35 18.23
Corruption Perception Index 9,546 4.097 2.533
Rule of Law 5,920 3.206 0.957
Unemployment 23,060 7.838 4.780
Export 22,710 72,579 105,246
Population 26,640 7,465 20,423
GDP 26,640 432,743 1,136,175
Distance 26,640 7312 4,729
decisions. To do this, we investigate three specifications below. The first 
specification is designed to set the stage. In this case, we allow the 
coefficient on the tax rate to vary between developed and developing 
countries:
LogFDIi|t = a 0 + aiDev_Dum , + a 2Year_Dum , + a 1Source_Dum i 
+ a 4Tax,/( + a 5Govemance„, + a 6Tax*Dev_Dum,),
+ X  0„Controlsm/, + u ,,,, (1)
where FDI^ is the stock of FDI in destination country i coming from  
source country j  in year t, Dev_Dum, represents a developing/devel­
oped-country dummy, Year_Dum, represents a year dummy, Source_ 
Dum, represents a dummy for the source country, Tax,,, represents the 
effective corporate tax rate, G overnance is a measure of governance 
(either bad governance— the corruption perception index— or good  
governance— the rule-of-law index) and Controls»,,, represents control 
variable n.
A main finding from this first specification is that the marginal 
impact of taxes on the stock of FDI differs depending on whether the 
host country is developed or developing. We find that lower corporate  
taxes in the destination country increase incoming FDI in developed  
countries, but not in developing countries. O ur second specification 
investigates one possible explanation for this result. It allows for an 
interaction effect between governance and taxes, but does not allow the 
coefficients to vary between developed and developing countries. It is 
similar to equation 1 above, but has an interaction between gover-
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nance and the effective corporate tax rate and does not have a 
developing-country dummy:
LogFDIjj, = a 0 +  <*1 Year_Dum, + a 2Source_Dum,
+ a 3Tax,y, + (^Governance,,, + a 5Tax'fGovemance,/,
+x 0-Controls^, + u ,|( . (2)
Our third specification investigates the issue further by asking 
whether any interaction effect between governance and taxes differs 
between developing and developed countries. The third specification 
adds a triple interaction of governance, the developing-country dummy, 
and the tax rate, adds each of these variables individually, and adds a 
full set of double interaction terms:
LogFDIijt = a 0 + aiDev_Dum , + a 2Year_Dum,
+ a 3Source_Dum, + a 4Tax,/(
+ a 5Govemance,y, + a 6T ax*Govemance„, 
+ a 7Tax*Dev_Dum,/( + a s Governance,;, *Dev_Dum,)( 
+a<)Tax*Govemance*Dev_Dum,/, + ^0„C ontrols„,/( + u,;(.
(3)
In all specifications, the semi-log specification implies a nonlinear, 
exponential relationship between the stock of FDI and the explanatory 
variables. The pooled nature of the data can create a downward bias 
in the standard errors due to repeated cross-sections (leading to unwar­
ranted significance of coefficients). We therefore present clustered stan­
dard errors, which allows for an arbitrary correlation in the errors 
of the cluster (the source-destination pair in our case) for all of our 
regressions.
Table 3.4 presents results for our three specifications using the cor­
ruption perception index of Transparency International. Table 3.5 pres­
ents the results using the rule-of-law measure.
The first column in table 3.4 presents results with the tax rate, the 
corruption perception index, the tax rate interacted with the a dummy  
variable that takes the value of one for developing countries and 
zero for developed countries, and our control variables (including the 
dummy for developed countries as an intercept shifter). Except for 
unemployment and the dummy variable for a developing country, all 
of our control variables are significant. Population has a positive sign, 
indicating that a larger market attracts FDI. GDP has a negative sign,
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Table 3.4
FDI, taxes, and corruption (corruption perception index measure). Dependent variable: 
log of FDI stock.
(1) (2) (3)
Effective corporate tax rate -0.0340” * -0.0421*** -0.0364***
(0.0062) (0.0095) (0.0106)
Corruption -0.111“ * -0.206*** -0.149*
(0.0317) (0.0551) (0.0869)
Corruption x Tax rate 0.0041** 0.0012
(0.00199) (0.0031)
Tax rate x Developing-country 0.0218** -0.0989**
dummy (0.0105) (0.0503)
Corruption x Developing-country -0.336*
dummy (0.188)
Corruption x Developing-country 0.0175**
dummy x Tax rate (0.0079)
Developing-country dummy -0.476 1.876
(0.337) (1.177)
Unemployment 0.0174 0.0150 0.0167
(0.0132) (0.0129) (0.0132)
Population 0.0043* 0.0046* 0.0049*
(0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0026)
GDP -0.0031*** -0.0033*** -0.0031***
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Exports (lagged) 0.0638*** 0.0636*** 0.0639***
(0.0068) (0.0067) (0.0068)
Distance -0.114*** -0.112*** -0.116***
0.0043* 0.0046* 0.0049*
Constant 10.58*** 10.78*** 10.47***
(0.246) (0.281) (0.311)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes
Source dummy Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4108 4108 4108
R2 0.711 0.711 0.712
Clustered and robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks denote p < 0.01 (***), 
p < 0.05 (**), and p < 0.1 (*).
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Table 3.5
FDI, taxes, and rule of law. Dependent variable: log of FDI stock.
(1) (2) (3)
Effective corporate tax rate -0.0411*” 0.0656*** 0.0633
(0.00605) (0.0209) (0.0636)
Rule of law 0.609” * 1.064*** 1.647*”
(0.129) (0.161) (0.489)
Rule of law x Tax rate -0.0258*” -0.0244
(0.00566) (0.0155)
Tax rate x Developing-country 0.0582*** -0.0380
dummy (0.0107) (0.0751)
Rule of law x Developing- -1.172*
country dummy (0.628)
Rule of law x Tax rate x 0.0176
Developing-country dummy (0.0225)
Developing-country dummy -1.021*** 3.868*
(0.344) (2.281)
Unemployment 0.0292” 0.0245* 0.0283*
(0.0140) (0.0138) (0.0145)
Population 0.0087*** 0.0088” * 0.0075” *
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028)
GDP -0.0032” * -0.0035*” -0.0035” *
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Exports (lagged) 0.0651*” 0.0653*** 0.0673*”
(0.0068) (0.0067) (0.007)
Distance -0.110” * -0.106*” -0.106***
(0.0144) (0.0141) (0.0145)
Constant 7.809*” 5.924*” 3.302
(0.614) (0.694) (2.094)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes
Source dummy Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2186 2186 2186
R2 0.709 0.707 0.712
Clustered and robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks denote p < 0.01 (***), 
p < 0.05 (*’ ), and p < 0.1 (*).
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which we interpret as controlling for the marginal product of capital 
or return on investment. Exports, interpreted as controlling for open­
ness, are positively related to FDI. Distance has a negative relation to 
FDI, as suggested by the gravity equation.
The first thing to note is the highly significant and negative effect of 
taxes on FDI for developed countries, but not for developing countries. 
Note that the specification includes not only the tax rate, but also its 
interaction with a developing-country dummy, which takes on a value 
of one if a country is developing and zero if the country is developed. 
Thus, the coefficient on the tax rate is that for developed countries. The 
coefficient of -0 .034  is the semi-elasticity of FDI to the tax rate, and at 
3.4 percent it is almost identical to the 3.3 percent mean semi-elasticity 
of 427 studies as reported by de Mooij and Ederveen (2008, p. 12) and 
mentioned in the introduction to the present chapter. Evaluating at the 
sample mean tax rate of 31 percent yields an elasticity of FDI to the tax 
rate of about -1  for developed countries. That is, a 1 percent increase 
in the tax rate decreases FDI by about 1 percent for developed coun­
tries, somewhat lower than the estimates of Altshuler et at. cited in the 
introduction. For developing countries the coefficient is much lower; 
adding the coefficient on the interaction term yields a coefficient for 
developing countries of only -0 .012. Moreover, the standard error asso­
ciated with this coefficient implies that the point estimate is not signifi­
cantly different from zero for developing countries. Hence, these results 
reconfirm the findings of Goodspeed, Martinez-Vazquez, and Zhang 
(2011) that host countries' corporate taxes affect FDI going to developed  
countries but do not affect FDI going to developing countries. Though 
it is possible that some of this effect could be due to some resource-rich  
developing countries where location-specific rents overwhelm any tax 
effect, we do not pursue that line of reasoning here. We leave that for 
future investigation and simply note here that developed countries are 
also sometimes resource-rich.
The second thing to note about the results in column 1 of table 3.4 
is the significant negative effect of host-country corruption on incom­
ing FDI. Evaluating the coefficient of -0.111 at the mean corruption 
value of 4.1 yields an elasticity of FDI with respect to the corruption  
measure of -0 .45 . That is, a 10 percent rise in the corruption index yields 
a 4.5 percent decrease in FDI. This implies that corruption deters FDI, 
and is consistent with the hypothesis that corruption itself is a type 
of tax.
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The question remains as to why FDI entering developing countries 
seems to react less to host-country corporate taxes. As was noted above, 
one possibility is that taxes and corruption interact. If corruption is 
viewed by multinationals as a tax on doing business, and if tax admin­
istration in developing countries is weak, the more important "tax" in 
a developing country might be the bribery system. Moreover, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1993) argue that bribes are actually much more distortion- 
ary and costly to an econom y than tax payments.
Column 2 in table 3.4 begins to assess this argument by interacting 
the tax rate with the corruption index instead of the developing-coun­
try dummy. The result is a positive and significant coefficient, suggest­
ing that companies that invest in foreign countries do in fact view 
corruption and bribery as substitutes to some extent. Host-country  
corruption has a greater impact on FDI when taxes are low, and host- 
country taxes have a greater impact on FDI when corruption is low. If 
taxes are zero, the corruption coefficient is -0 .2 0 6  (resulting in an elas­
ticity twice that implied by column 1), whereas it is -0 .08  evaluated at 
the mean tax rate in the sample of 31 percent (resulting in an elasticity 
slightly lower than implied by column 1). If corruption is zero, the tax 
coefficient is -0 .042  (somewhat higher than that obtained in column 1); 
if corruption is at its maximum in the sample, the tax coefficient is close 
to zero.
Column 2 of table 3.4 thus supports the proposition that taxes and 
corruption are substitutes. This suggests that the result that host cor­
porate taxes do not affect FDI entering developing countries is due to 
corruption in developing countries, combined perhaps with weak tax 
administration. However, there may be other reasons that developing 
countries are different. To test this, column 3 adds a triple interaction 
of corruption, the tax rate, and the developing-country dummy, along 
with double interactions of the tax rate and corruption, the developing- 
country dum m y and the tax rate, and the developing-country dummy 
and corruption.
We begin our discussion of column 3 by focusing on the tax rate. 
The interaction of corruption with the tax rate is insignificant in column 
3, so the coefficient on the tax rate of -0 .0364  is that for developed 
countries. Moreover the coefficient is not significantly different from 
that of column 1. The coefficient for developing countries involves 
several terms: -0 .0364  -  0.0989 (from interaction between the tax rate 
and the developing-country dummy ) + 0.00117 x corruption (from
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interaction between the tax rate and corruption) + 0.0175 x corruption 
(from the triple interaction). Evaluating at the mean corruption value 
for developing countries of 6.5 and adding together yields a coefficient 
of -0 .014  for developing countries. This is consistent with the findings 
of column 1, but gives a more nuanced picture: the marginal effect of 
taxes is low for developing countries with high corruption, whereas 
those with low corruption m ay indeed find that taxes are an important 
factor in FDI location. When corruption is high, bribes that go to corrupt 
tax officials may make a high tax rate irrelevant, as the taxes are evaded, 
and the level of corruption becomes the more important force for 
FDI. From a domestic political viewpoint, high tax rates may protect 
the interests of corrupt tax officials in soliciting bribes from foreign 
investors.
Turning to the coefficient on corruption in column 3, we see that the 
value for developed countries is -0 .149 , since the interaction of corrup­
tion and the tax rate is insignificant and the value for the developing- 
country dum m y is zero. This is somewhat higher than the estimate for 
column 1. For developing countries, the estimate is -0 .149  -  0.336 
(from the interaction between corruption and the developing-country 
dum m y) + 0 0.00117 x  tax rate (from the interaction between the tax 
rate and corruption) + 0.0175 x tax rate (from the triple interaction). 
Adding yields a coefficient of -0 .485  + 0.0187 x  tax rate for developing 
countries. This is a striking result. If tax rates are low in the host 
country, then corruption indeed lowers host-country FDI. Flowever, as 
the tax rate rises, the impact of corruption becomes smaller. Indeed, if 
tax rates are very high, corruption actually leads to higher FDI in 
developing countries. The explanation would appear to be that with 
excessive corporate taxation, corruption, presumably in the form of 
bribing the tax authorities, allows multinationals to avoid the high 
taxes, thus increasing FDI.
An alternative variable to the corruption perception index is the 
rule-of-law measure of Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009). This 
measure, as described above, is more focused on property rights than 
on bribes
Table 3.5 presents results based on the rule-of-law measure. In 
general, the results are similar to those presented in table 3.4, although 
the coefficients in the specification with the triple interaction have less 
statistical significance.
We begin by discussing the results for column 1. All control variables 
have the sam e sign as in table 3.4, and all are significant, including
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unemployment (which was insignificant in table 3.4). The coefficient 
on the corporate tax rate is that for developed countries and is negative 
and significant, with a slightly higher coefficient of -0.041, and a cor­
respondingly higher elasticity estimate of about -1 .25 . The estimate for 
developing countries is 0.0171— a positive number that may at first be 
puzzling. However, considering the findings of columns 2 and 3 of 
table 3.4 (that corruption and taxes in fact interact), this could reflect a 
similar phenomenon with respect to taxes and the rule of law. The 
coefficient on the rule of law is positive and significant— greater respect 
for property rights increases FDI. The elasticity of FDI with respect to 
the rule of law evaluated at the mean is close to 2.
Column 2 of table 3.5 uses an interaction of the tax rate with the 
rule of law instead of column l 's  interaction of the tax rate with a 
developing-country dummy. As in table 3.4, there is a significant inter­
action effect suggesting that the rule of law and corporate taxes are 
viewed as substitutes by multinational firms. When the rule of law is 
high, the corporate tax deters FDI, but at low levels of the rule of law 
the corporate tax rate actually has a positive effect on FDI. Evaluated  
at the mean rule-of-law value of developing countries, the coefficient 
on the corporate tax rate is very close to zero (0.004). Evaluating at the 
mean rule-of-law value of developed countries, the coefficient on the 
corporate tax rate is -0 .038 , close to the value estimated in column 1 of 
table 3.5 as well as to estimates from table 3.4. The results of column 2 
thus support the result that FDI responds to corporate taxes in devel­
oped but not developing countries. The mechanism suggested by this 
column is that the rule of law interacts with the tax rate, and when the 
rule of law is low (as it is in developing countries) the marginal impact 
of corporate taxes on FDI location is blunted.
The coefficient of the rule of law in column 2 is positive and signifi­
cant, but its impact is reduced as the corporate tax rate rises. If the 
corporate tax rate were zero, the elasticity of FDI and the rule of law 
would be almost 3.4 when evaluated at the mean value for the rule of 
law. As the corporate tax rate rises, the elasticity falls, however. The 
elasticity of FDI and the rule of law fall to 2.6 when the tax rate is at 
its mean in the sample (31.4 percent). This result is similar to the result 
of table 3.4 with respect to corruption: when corporate taxes become 
excessively high, marginal improvements in property rights have less 
of an effect on FDI location.
The final column of table 3.5 adds the triple interaction term as well 
as double interaction terms. The rule of law is positive and significant
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and the interaction of the rule of law and the tax rate is negative, but 
not significant. The rule of law interacted with the developing-country 
dummy is negative and significant, but the triple interaction term is 
insignificant. As many of the interaction terms are insignificant, this 
column reveals less, but it suggests a high elasticity of FDI to the rule 
of law for developed countries (5.3), with a somewhat lower but still 
relatively high elasticity for developing countries (1.5). These results 
seem to confirm the importance of the rule of law in both developed  
and developing countries.
3 Conclusion
There is a large literature documenting that high corporate taxes in host 
countries deter foreign direct investment. However, some recent papers 
have questioned the robustness of this result in developing countries. 
Among the papers that do so are Goodspeed, Martinez-Vazquez, and 
Zhang 2011 (in which we find that host countries' taxes affect FDI 
entering developed but not developing countries), a 2009 paper by 
Dharmapala and Hines (who find that taxes affect US FDI in well- 
governed tax havens but not those that are poorly governed), and a 
2009 paper by Fatica (who finds that the sensitivity of foreign invest­
ment to the tax rate varies with the institutional quality of the host 
country).
In this chapter we have investigated one of the possible explanations 
for a weaker relationship between corporate taxes and FDI in develop­
ing countries: the presence of a tradeoff between taxes and corruption. 
Although some previous papers have documented a negative effect of 
corruption on FDI, little work has been done on how governance may 
interact with taxes. In this chapter w e hypothesized that the presence 
of corruption weakens the influence of corporate taxes in the location 
of FDI because bribes and weak tax enforcement tend to reduce the 
cost of taxes, and corruption becomes the more important cost for 
multinationals. Since corruption tends to be more prevalent and tax 
administration weaker in developing countries, this helps explain why, 
in general, corporate taxes have less of an impact on FDI location in 
the developing countries.
We have explored the interaction of corporate taxes, governance, 
and developing countries, using several empirical specifications. We 
have used two measures of governance in our specifications, one a 
corruption index and the other a measure of the rule of law measure.
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Before summarizing our findings, w e should note that our results 
use aggregate data and that identification com es from cross-sectional 
variation. Further research using disaggregated data and other identi­
fication strategies would be highly desirable.
In our estimations we found, first, a highly significant and negative 
effect of taxes on FDI for developed countries, but not for developing 
countries, and a separate individual significant negative effect of cor­
ruption in the host country and positive effect of the rule of law on 
incoming FDI. Second w e found that foreign investors view taxation 
and bribery to some extent as substitutes. Host-country corruption has 
a greater effect on FDI when taxes are low, and host-country taxes have 
a greater effect on FDI when corruption is low. This suggests that one 
part of the explanation of our first finding that host-country corporate 
taxes do not affect FDI entering developing countries is that corporate 
taxes and corruption are acting as substitutes in developing countries. 
Our results with respect to the rule of law indicate that the sam e rea­
soning would explain Dharmapala and Hines' result that low taxes in 
tax havens affect FDI if the tax haven is well governed but not if the 
tax haven is poorly governed.
Third, we found that the marginal effect of taxes is low for develop­
ing countries with high corruption while developing countries with 
low corruption may indeed find that taxes are an important factor in 
FDI location. The explanation is that bribes that go to corrupt tax offi­
cials make a high tax rate irrelevant as the taxes are evaded. We also 
found that the marginal effect of corruption on FDI location falls as the 
corporate marginal tax rate rises. The explanation would appear to 
be that with high levels of formal taxation corruption allows foreign 
investment to avoid the excessively high taxes. But the result is likely 
to be more costly for the host economy as suggested by the argument 
of Shleifer and Vishny (1993).
From the viewpoint of political economy, our results may help to 
explain w hy it is still common to find tax codes in developing countries 
with high statutory corporate tax rates. Keeping those rates high may 
protect the interests of corrupt tax officials in soliciting bribes from 
foreign investors. However, some of those rents may be diminished 
with the introduction of formal tax holidays and incentives. If the holi­
days and incentives apply only to foreign investors, this could reduce 
both the tax burden and bribes solicited from reluctant-to-pay foreign 
investors, while maintaining rents due to high tax rates and bribes from 
domestic firms.
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